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I. INTRODUCTION
Social lives are increasingly unmoored from physical location. This
“virtualization” arises in part from successive waves of technological innovation
that have repeatedly transformed human conceptions of space, place, and
proximity. In the 19th and 20th centuries, new developments in rail, automobile,
and airplane travel shrank the sense of physical distance.1 Communications
technologies such as the telegraph, the telephone, and the Internet allowed data
to move across territorial boundaries with increasing ease. And 21st century
*

Walter S. Cox Professor of Law, The George Washington University. Some material in
this Essay is derived from Paul Schiff Berman, Legal Jurisdiction and the
Deterritorialization of Social Life, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF VIRTUAL AND
AUGMENTED REALITY (2019), and Paul Schiff Berman, Yahoo! v. LICRA, Private
International Law, and the Deterritorialization of Data, in GLOBAL PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ADJUDICATION WITHOUT FRONTIERS (Horatia Muir Watt et al. eds.,
2019).
1
See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 311, 425-32 (2002) (discussing legal jurisdiction and changing social conceptions of
space, place, and distance).
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developments in social media, virtual worlds, augmented reality, electronic
financial transactions, drones, robotics, and artificial intelligence allow human
beings to interact in more and more robust ways at a physical remove from their
location. Meanwhile, the ubiquity of multinational corporations, global supply
chains, and cloud-based data all mean that our lives are more likely to be affected
by activity that is spatially distant. Virtual effects often replace direct territorial
effects.
As a thought experiment, one can imagine an “effects map,” in which one
identifies a territorial locality and plots on a map every action that has an effect
on that locality.2 Five hundred years ago, such effects would almost surely have
been clustered around the territory, with perhaps some additional effects located
in a particular distant imperial location. One hundred years ago, those effects
might have begun spreading out. But today, while locality is surely not
irrelevant, the effects would likely be diffused over many corporate,
governmental, technological, and migratory centers.
Electronic data—everything from e-mails and text messages to Facebook and
Instagram posts to Twitter pronouncements to drone warfare data to search
algorithms to financial transactions to cloud data storage—travels around the
globe with little relationship to physical territory. In addition, all of this data is
often in the custody and control of data intermediaries such as Google,
Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, private military contractors, and
so on.3 As a result, our virtual lives are often controlled less by governments and
more by private corporations that own the platforms upon which our virtual lives
are based.4
Three important consequences flow from this ubiquitous technology-enabled,
data-driven virtual global societal activity. First, the territorial location of data
becomes increasingly arbitrary and substantively unimportant. If I, as a United
States citizen based in Maryland, have a g-mail account, and Google, a U.S.
corporation, decides to store my archived e-mails in Ireland or France or
Indonesia (or indeed to split up the data fragments that make up each e-mail
message among data warehouses in all three countries), that decision seems
irrelevant to any question of whether I have somehow affiliated myself with any
of those communities or governments for purposes of jurisdictional or choiceof-law analysis. Second, because of this virtualization of social life and
2
David G. Post, “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1381-83
(2002) (articulating this thought experiment).
3
See infra Section 3.
4
See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (forthcoming, 2019); MOLLY K. LAND, THE PROBLEM OF
PLATFORM LAW: LEGAL P LURALISM ON SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS, THE OXFORD RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL LEGAL P LURALISM (Paul Schiff Berman ed., 2019, forthcoming).

2019]

Legal Jurisdiction and Virtual Social Life

105

deterritorialization of data, territorially based courts (or law enforcement
authorities generally) will sometimes be less able to enforce their decisions
because those decisions require cooperation from relevant actors in far-flung
communities.5 Third, as a direct result of the first two problems, governmental
and judicial authorities are increasingly turning to multinational corporate data
intermediaries to carry out and enforce their orders because only those
companies have sufficient global reach to make legal rulings effective.6 But
deputizing these intermediaries to become enforcement agents, while logical and
possibly effective, raises new problems regarding the scope of governmental
authority and the distortions involved in privatizing law enforcement.
Interestingly, even though scholars first began raising these issues at the dawn
of the commercial internet era as far back as 1995, the jurisprudential solutions
we see so far are still largely unsatisfying, both conceptually and practically.
Indeed, as with many private international law problems that have bedeviled
courts and commentators for hundreds of years, there may not be a fully
satisfactory solution. Moreover, even if there were a single unifying theory for
private international law in the Information Age, it’s not at all clear that everyone
would agree on what that theory should be. “Thus, as legal pluralists have long
realized, there is never a stable ‘solution’ to the reality of legal pluralism.”7
Instead, “legal pluralism is an inevitable (and perhaps not even an undesirable)
result of a world with multiple communities and multiple legal and quasi-legal
systems.”8
Yet, even if there is no single unifying theory that could put an end to legal
conflicts, we can still survey the types of cases that are arising and analyze the
efforts of courts and others to navigate the problems that arise from the
increasing virtualization of social life. This Essay aims to do that, providing a
series of real-life case studies that any consideration of 21st century conflict-oflaws jurisprudence must face.

5
For example, if a Canadian court issues an order against a company for trademark
infringement, but that company has no presence in Canada, that Court order will either need
to be enforced by the courts in the company’s home country or by some third party, such as
Google. See Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 at 829-30 (Can.).
6
Paul Schiff Berman, Yahoo! v. LICRA, Private International Law, and the
Deterritorialization of Data, in GLOBAL PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ADJUDICATION
WITHOUT FRONTIERS 392 (Horatia Muir Watt et al. eds., 2019).
7
Id.; see generally Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. OF L.
& SOC. SCI. 225, 226 (2009) (discussing the history of legal pluralism).
8
Berman, Yahoo! v. LICRA, Private International Law, and the Deterritorialization
of Data, supra note 6; see generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012) (discussing legal pluralism from both a
descriptive and normative perspective).
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II. ONLINE SPEECH9
Many of the earliest debates about jurisdiction and online virtual interaction
involved issues of speech, where the speech in question was legal in one
location, but illegal in another.10 The paradigmatic case involved Yahoo.com.
Indeed, it is fitting that this most famous legal dispute of the early internet era
implicated all three conflict-of-law doctrines: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
judgment recognition.
On May 22, 2000, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris issued a
preliminary injunction against Yahoo.com, ordering the site to take all possible
measures to prevent access in France to Yahoo! auction sites that sell Nazi
memorabilia or other items that are sympathetic to Nazism or constitute
Holocaust denial.11 Undisputedly, selling such merchandise in France would
violate French law, and there would be no jurisdictional dispute had the French
authorities limited their prosecution to the French end-users who were
downloading the illegal materials from Yahoo!’s auction sites. But even in the
late 1990s legal authorities were already realizing that it is often far more
effective to proceed against an intermediary such as Yahoo!, both because the
intermediary is usually a larger corporate actor and therefore easier to find and
because one legal action can address a broader problem rather than requiring
separate enforcement actions against each end-user. In effect, the intermediary
becomes the enforcement agent of whatever legal authority issues the order.
In this case, the intermediary question had two parts, however. Certainly the
French court had undisputed jurisdictional authority over Yahoo.fr, Yahoo!’s
French subsidiary, and Yahoo.fr complied with requests that access to such sites
be blocked.12 What made this action noteworthy was that the suit was brought
not only against Yahoo.fr, but against Yahoo.com, an American corporation, and
the court sought to enjoin access to non-French websites stored on Yahoo.com’s
non-French servers.13
Of course, one can easily see why the court and the complainants in this action
would have taken this additional step. Shutting down access to web pages on
9
Material in this section was published in Legal Jurisdiction and the
Deterritorialization of Data, 71 VAND. L. REV. en banc 11, 18-19 (2018); see also Berman,
Yahoo! v. LICRA, Private International Law, and the Deterritorialization of Data, supra
note 6, at 394-96.
10 The Yahoo! Case was one of many. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of
Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 412-20 (2002) (discussing the early internet cases).
11 LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc., Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [TGI] [High Court of
Paris] France, Paris, May 22, 2000, J. Gomez (Fr.), https://perma.cc/738B-V9BM (Richard
Salis, trans.).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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Yahoo.fr does no good at all if French citizens can, by entering a slightly
different URL in their search box, simply go to Yahoo.com and access those
same pages. On the other hand, Yahoo! argued that the French assertion of
jurisdiction over yahoo.com was impermissibly extraterritorial in scope.14
According to Yahoo!, in order to comply with the injunction it would need to
remove the pages from its servers altogether (not just for the French audience),
thereby denying such material to non-French citizens, many of whom had the
right to access the materials under the laws of their countries.15 Most
importantly, Yahoo! argued that such extraterritorial censoring of American web
content would run afoul of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.16
Thus, Yahoo! and others contended that the French assertion of jurisdiction was
an impermissible attempt by France to impose global rules for internet
expression.17 As Greg Wrenn, associate general counsel for Yahoo!’s
international division, put it at the time, “We are not going to acquiesce in the
notion that foreign countries have unlimited jurisdiction to regulate the content
of U.S.-based sites.”18
Yet, it is easy to see that the extraterritoriality charge runs in both directions.
If France were not able to block the access of French citizens to proscribed
material, then the United States would effectively be imposing First Amendment
norms on the entire world. And though geographical tracking software might
seem to solve the problem by allowing websites to offer different content to
different users, such a solution would still require the sites to analyze the laws
of all jurisdictions to determine what material to filter for which users.
The arguments in the Yahoo! case therefore establish the basic dichotomy that
we have subsequently seen repeated in case after case. On the one hand, legal
authorities wish to assert jurisdiction anywhere a community is affected by webbased content. This tends to push in the direction of universal jurisdiction,
because content uploaded anywhere in the world can potentially cause harmful
effects anywhere else in the world. In response, defendants argue for jurisdiction
only where content is uploaded or only where their servers are located or only
in their home jurisdiction. This theory of jurisdiction tends to result either in
arbitrary or easily manipulable jurisdictional principles (such as where a server
is located), or a system where actors impacting communities across the globe
can only be sued or regulated in their home jurisdiction. Both of these solutions
seem unsatisfying. And finding some other non-web-based territorial nexus to
Id.
Id.
16 Id.
17 Carl S. Kaplan, Experts See Online Speech Case as Bellweather, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/05/technology/experts-see-online-speech-case-asbellwether.html.
18 Id.
14
15
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bolster an assertion of jurisdiction can also be problematic. For example,
regardless of how one resolves the jurisdictional question in the Yahoo! case, it
seems clear that where in the world the actual paper share certificate by which
Yahoo! owned Yahoo.fr is irrelevant to the underlying jurisdictional issues at
stake.
In the end, Yahoo! “voluntarily” complied with the French court order,19 but
simultaneously filed suit in United States District Court in the Northern District
of California, seeking a declaratory judgment that the French court’s orders were
not enforceable in the United States pursuant to the First Amendment.20
Accordingly, what had started as a jurisdictional dispute was transformed into
its flip side: a question of recognition of judgments.
Faced with the question of whether or not to enforce the French court’s order,
the district court started from the assumption that United States law (and United
States constitutional norms) must apply.21 Thus, the court framed the issue for
decision solely in U.S. constitutional terms: “What is at issue here is whether it
is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States for another
nation to regulate speech by a United States resident within the United States on
the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet users in that nation.”22
Conceptualized in this way, the district court had little difficulty determining
that enforcement of the French court order would violate the First Amendment,
concluding both that the French judgment constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination and that it was unconstitutionally vague.23 The court therefore
concluded that a United States court could not have issued such an order in the
first instance without violating constitutional free speech norms.24 But of course,
in a judgment recognition case, that is not the appropriate inquiry. Indeed, in the
domestic context the US Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause requires
recognition of judgments that might be completely unavailable or even
potentially illegal in the state where recognition is sought.25 Thus, the real
question should have been whether this was the type of judgment that should
have been recognized, not whether the court could have issued the ruling as an
19 Lisa Guernsey, Yahoo to Try Harder to Rid Postings of Hateful Material, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/03/business/
technology-yahoo-to-try-harder-to-rid-postings-of-hateful-material.html.
20 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme, 169 F.Supp.2d
1181, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
21 Id. at 1187.
22 Id. at 1186.
23 Id. at 1189-90.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (holding that the judgment of
a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi even if the Missouri
judgment rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law).
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original matter.
To its credit, the district court did include a brief discussion of the judgment
recognition issue in a section titled “Comity.”26 And the court acknowledged
that “United States courts generally recognize foreign judgments and decrees
unless enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to the country’s interests.”27
Yet, after reiterating that the French judgment “clearly would be inconsistent
with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in the United States,”28 the
district court judge concluded that, because the foreign order would
unconstitutionally chill speech occurring within U.S. borders, “the principle of
comity is outweighed by the Court’s obligation to uphold the First
Amendment.”29
Thus, while ostensibly addressing principles of judgment recognition, the
court ultimately returned to the idea that whenever a judgment would be
unconstitutional if issued in the United States, enforcing that judgment also
would be unconstitutional, or at least sufficiently contrary to state interests as to
overwhelm any principles of comity. By eliding the difference between issuing
a judgment and enforcing a judgment, however, the court neglected to apply in
more detail the various principles of judgment recognition or to consider more
carefully those circumstances in which U.S. interests might not truly be
threatened by the application of a foreign norm.30
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed, on other grounds,
by a 6-5 vote.31 Three judges in the majority determined that the district court
did not have personal jurisdiction over the French defendants until those
defendants actually came to the United States seeking to enforce the French
judgment.32 The other three judges making up the majority also dismissed, but
did so on ripeness grounds, similarly concluding that the enforcement issue
should not be decided until the French defendants actually sought enforcement.33
Thus, the Court of Appeals majority never addressed the judgment recognition
issues upon which the district court had relied.
Lest we think that this case from the early years of the 21st century represents
simply the growing pains associated with applying law to a new technology, it
is worth considering the following group of more recent cases. Indeed, because
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme, 169 F.Supp.2d at 1192-93.
Id. at 1192.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1193.
30 See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005)
(discussing further various issues of judgment recognition).
31 Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1201 (9th Cir. 2006).
32 Id.
33 Id.
26
27
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more and more of our social identity is now stored remotely by third parties, far
from our physical location, very little of our data identity actually remains tied
to our person anymore. This increasing virtualization of social life is resurfacing
many of the same conundrums for jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgment
recognition that were identified in the early days of the commercial internet.
III. VIRTUAL WORLDS
Where is a virtual world for jurisdictional purposes? The answer depends in
part on your perspective.34 From within the world itself, it feels like one is
somewhere else. Think of the spatial set of metaphors. This is a “world.” One
“goes to it” or “enters it.” From this perspective, a virtual world is a new
community of individuals unbound by their literal physical location, “meeting”
and forming a set of community bonds that could be stronger than the bonds they
feel with their physically-oriented communities.
On the other hand, for one external to the virtual world watching the
participants, there is no world at all, just a large number of people located
somewhere in physical space, looking at computer screens. Regardless of what
sort of interactions they are having online, from this perspective these people are
always bound to hundreds of separate territorially-based communities and
therefore subject to the legal jurisdiction of those communities.
Given the relationship between the social experience of community and the
legal definition of community, this difference of perspective matters. If one sees
the relevant community affiliation as the in-game community, then the law of
that community is established through the software code built into the world by
the designer, the rules of behavior dictated by the game itself, the end-user
license agreement (or EULA), and the social norms of that virtual world. In
contrast, if the relevant community affiliation is the territorial location of its
users, then a slew of national laws governing speech, depictions of violence,
gambling, sexualized imagery, and so on might apply.
Or, one could try to divide up the jurisdictional pie. Virtual world designers
and distributors could be subject to the law of their corporate headquarters, while
users could be subject to the jurisdiction of their home countries. However,
experience shows that governments are unlikely to be satisfied going after only
end-users. The larger corporate actor profiting from the activity makes for a
much more palatable (and easier to find) target.
For example, consider the Yahoo! case discussed above. Undeniably, the
34 See James Grimmelmann, Virtual Borders: The Interdependence of Real and Virtual
Worlds, 11 FIRST MONDAY 1, 3 (2006); Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 (2003).
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French end users were violating French hate speech law and could be
prosecuted. But those individuals were difficult to find, and prosecuting a few
might well be futile because more would likely take their places. Thus, it is not
surprising that French prosecutors focused on Yahoo! itself. And while today’s
technology makes it far easier for websites to track the physical location of users
than in 2000, the essential problem for virtual world designers remains: will they
potentially face liability for content of their virtual spaces based on the laws in
the jurisdiction of each end-user? And even if they can track where those endusers are, altering the elements of the virtual world to accord with each
jurisdiction’s laws may be difficult.
The EULA could, in theory, solve such jurisdictional and choice-of-law
problems by imposing a uniform set of rules on all end-users, regardless of
where they are in the world. Yet, EULAs have three possible shortcomings.
First, because the EULA is a contract, it is potentially subject to local contract
law. And even if the EULA contains a choice-of-law clause, it is possible that a
court would override that clause by invalidating the contract itself as
unconscionable or a violation of local public policy. Second, because the EULA
is a contract between the game designer/distributor and each user, it might not
cover torts one user suffers in a virtual world due to the acts of another user. And
third, the EULA similarly would not apply if a local regulatory authority claimed
that criminal behavior was taking place in the virtual world, which of course
could include acts criminal in one jurisdiction but not necessarily in others.
Virtual worlds and territorially-based sovereignties also potentially are forced
to interact because objects and attributes in virtual worlds may have market
value outside of the virtual world, setting up the possibility of transactions that
territorially-based authorities (and game designers themselves) may wish to
regulate.35 For example, in many virtual worlds, avatars that possess certain
objects or territory or have acquired certain experience can gain access to parts
of the world others cannot, or they can do tasks or perform feats that others
cannot.36 As such, these objects or territories or attributes have value to those
immersed in the world. And of course, markets will almost inevitably arise to
allow the buying and selling of nearly anything human beings value.
As long as that market operates only within the virtual world itself, exchanges
are likely to be governed by in-world code, rules, and the EULA. But as soon as
two people exchange virtual items in-world while paying each other using
PayPal or Bitcoin or a credit card or a check, then territorially-based authorities
may well see the transaction as similar to any other and therefore within their
regulatory jurisdiction. If the parties are from different countries, we might have

35
36

See Grimmelmann, supra note 34, at 2.
Id. at 3.
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a choice-of-law or jurisdictional problem, just as we would with any other crossborder commercial transaction. But perhaps the law of the virtual world could
be deployed by a court as a touchstone for adjudicating the dispute. For example,
we might see courts using some idea of comity to defer to the norms of the virtual
world, just as courts sometimes use comity to defer to norms of other
jurisdictions even when not literally obligated to do so.
Of course, the dispute may not only be between two end-users. What if the
designer of the virtual world objects to the creation of this market, or demands
to have some power over the transaction, or a financial cut?37 We might then see
claims based on property rights in the servers on which virtual worlds run.38 Or
perhaps the designer could argue that the players are accessing the designer’s
computer systems without authorization for a non-permitted use.39 The trade
could also violate the EULA, spurring a contract claim. Or the market in virtual
goods could be violating the designer’s trademark or copyright. Each of these
claims would likely be pursued in a territorially-based court, invoking
territorially-based law.
Finally, an end-user might bring suit against a game designer/operator. In
Bragg v. Linden Research, for example, a user sued the operator of Second Life
because the operator nullified a transaction involving virtual property.40 The
federal district court determined that Pennsylvania could assert jurisdiction even
though the defendants were not from the state because a nationwide advertising
campaign had explicitly encouraged people to join Second Life in part by
promising them the ability to take ownership of virtual property.41 In addition,
Second Life had accepted payment from the plaintiff knowing the plaintiff was
in Pennsylvania.42 If such contacts are sufficient than it is not at all far-fetched
to think that suits against operators of virtual worlds could well be brought
anywhere a user is located. Moreover, it is worth noting that the court also did
not honor the Terms of Service governing Second Life—which dictated
mandatory arbitration and other provisions—because the contract was ruled to
Id. at 4.
See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 67 (2003) (recognizing a trespass
theory for unauthorized use of computer system).
39 See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012) (establishing
criminal and civil liability for “knowingly access[ing] a protected computer without
authorization, or exceed[ing] authorized access”); see also, e.g., Orin Kerr, Cybercrime’s
Scope: Interpreting ‘Access’ and ‘Authorization’ in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1596, 1598-99 (2003).
40 Bragg v. Linden, 487 F.Supp.2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
41 Id. at 600.
42 See id. at 599 (noting Circuit precedent that if the defendant knowingly conducts
business with forum state residents via a website, then the ‘‘purposeful availment’’
requirement is satisfied).
37
38
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be unconscionable and therefore invalid.43 This case therefore illustrates both
the potential for broad assertions of jurisdiction against virtual world operators
and the possibility that local law could be deployed to displace EULAs.
In contrast, in Mason v. Machine Zone, Inc., a court refused to find a
cognizable claim regarding in-game property.44 In Mason, the plaintiff tried to
bring a class action lawsuit against a game operator who sold in-game “gold”
for real dollars and then allowed players to gamble the gold at an in-game
casino.45 The plaintiff alleged that the algorithms controlling the games of
chance in the online casino were deliberately rigged against users, making it
more likely that they would squander the gold that they had purchased (and
presumably make them more likely to purchase yet more in-game gold to replace
what they lost).46
Interestingly, the court did not take seriously the idea that being deprived of
virtual currency could be a valid legal claim even if that currency were purchased
with real dollars. According to the court, “Perceived unfairness in the operation
and outcome of a game, where there are no real-world losses, harms, or injuries,
does not and cannot give rise to the award of a private monetary remedy by a
real-world court.”47 As formulated by the court, this statement seems potentially
plausible, but the whole point of the claim in Mason rested on the fact that there
were “real-world losses, harms, or injuries,” namely the dollars the plaintiffs
spent on the in-game gold that was then allegedly stolen from them through a
rigged algorithm. To take it out of a game context, if an individual purchases
Bitcoins using dollars and then is swindled out of the Bitcoins by a Bitcoin
exchange vendor, it seems unlikely that a court would dismiss such a claim as
not alleging any real-world harm. Indeed, as we will see, in a case presenting
just such an issue, a court did in fact find a potentially valid cause of action.
Thus, the “where” question in disputes involving virtual worlds remains
contested. Users could be deemed in the world or outside of it, and if outside
then we need to answer the further question of which community affiliation is
the most salient for jurisdictional and choice-of-law purposes.
IV. CLOUD-BASED DATA
In a sense, of course, many people live at least part of their lives in virtual
worlds whether they choose to or not. This is because more and more of our

Id. at 607.
Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F.Supp.3d 457, 459 (D. Md. 2015), aff’d, 851 F.3d
315 (4th Cir. 2017).
45 Id. at 458-59.
46 Id. at 460.
47 Id. at 459.
43
44
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social identity is stored remotely, far from our physical location. Whether it be
our e-mails, our social media posts, our musical preferences, our virtual world
activities, our online search histories, our photographs, or our banking and health
data, very little of our data identity actually remains tied to our person anymore.
This increasing deterritorialization of data and virtualization of identity create
conundrums for jurisdiction and choice of law.
For example, in 2013 US officers conducting a criminal drug investigation
sought a search warrant under federal law to seize the e-mails of a Microsoft
customer.48 This is usually a relatively routine process, and as long as the search
warrant is valid, then data storage companies such as Microsoft generally
comply.49 And in fact Microsoft did turn over all account information it had that
was being stored in the United States.50 However, the actual emails, and their
contents, were stored overseas in Dublin, Ireland.51 Microsoft refused to turn
over this content, arguing that the federal law pursuant to which the search
warrant was issued, the Stored Communications Act, could not be applied
extraterritorially.52
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed,53 albeit
reluctantly.54 Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the court
determined that because Congress had not, in the Stored Communications Act,55
contemplated cloud-based data storage and because it had used the word
“warrant” instead of “subpoena,” the Act had made no provision for subpoenas

48 Microsoft v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated as moot and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
49 See Developments in the Law — More Data, More Problems, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1715, 1722 (2018) (“Facebook received 32,716 requests for information from U.S. law
enforcement between January 2017 and June 2017. These requests covered 52,280 user
accounts and included 19,393 search warrants and 7632 subpoenas. In the same time period,
Google received 16,823 requests regarding 33,709 accounts, and Twitter received 2111
requests regarding 4594 accounts. Each company produced at least some information for
about eighty percent of requests.”).
50 Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 200.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 200-01.
53 Id. at 201.
54 Id. at 200 (Lynch, J., concurring) (“Despite ultimately agreeing with the result in this
case, I dwell on the reasons for thinking it close because the policy concerns raised by the
government are significant, and require the attention of Congress.”); The Second Circuit
denied the government’s motion to rehear the case en banc by a four-to-four plurality.
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2017) (en banc); All four
dissenting judges wrote separate opinions expressing their disagreement with both the legal
conclusions of the panel decision and its potential ramifications. See id. at 60 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting); id. at 62 (Cabranes, J., dissenting); id. at 69 (Raggi, J., dissenting); id. at
74 (Droney, J., dissenting).
55 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
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to apply beyond U.S. borders.56 Significantly, the physical location or the
nationality of the underlying subject of the investigation was irrelevant. Thus, as
interpreted by the Second Circuit, the Stored Communications Act might not
permit authorities to obtain a search warrant and seize e-mail records of a US
citizen located in the United States who sent e-mails to other US citizens from a
computer located in the United States. The only relevant territorial nexus appears
to be where the e-mail data happens to be stored. And significantly, this storage
decision is entirely within the control of the storage provider, leaving open the
possibility of manipulation in order to avoid the law of a particular sovereign.
In contrast, a district court in Pennsylvania subsequently ruled the opposite
way on a similar warrant involving Google.57 Here, the data question was in
some ways even more difficult because Google does not store customers’ data
in one location, such as Ireland. Instead, Google uses an algorithm that divides
an individual’s user data across data centers and even splinters the data such that
an email is not stored as a “cohesive digital file” but in “multiple data ‘shards,’”
each in a separate location around the world.58 Accordingly, even if US law
enforcement sought the data through government-to-government treaty, there
would be no one government to whom to address the request.
Unlike the Second Circuit, the court in the Google case reasoned that, if the
Stored Communications Act is meant to protect Fourth Amendment privacy
interests, then the relevant question is where the potential invasion of privacy
takes place, not where the data is located.59 And given that Google can move
customers’ data at will around the globe, the court concluded that forcing Google
to reterritorialize the data in the United States does not violate any privacy
interest.60 Then, once the data is repatriated the warrant can issue just as it would
in any other domestic situation.61
In order to resolve the ambiguity caused by these conflicting court decisions,
the US Congress in 2018 enacted the CLOUD Act.62 Under this statute US data
and communication companies must provide stored data for US citizens on any
server they own and operate when requested by warrant, regardless of where in
the world that data happens to be stored.63 Thus, the statute sensibly looks at the
underlying community affiliation of the user rather than the arbitrary territorial

Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 209, 212.
In re Search Warrant No. 16–960–M–01 to Google, 232 F.Supp.3d 708, 708 (E.D.
Pa. 2017).
58 Id. at 724.
59 Id. at 719-22.
60 Id. at 721.
61 Id. at 722.
62 CLOUD Act, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong. (2018).
63 CLOUD Act, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong., § 103(a)(1) (2018), codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2713 (2018).
56
57
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location of the data. On the other hand, the Act does provide mechanisms for the
communications companies or the courts to challenge or reject warrants if they
believe the request violates the privacy rights of the foreign country where the
data is stored.64 This caveat still seems to unduly reify the physical location of
data even though that physical location may be arbitrary and completely
unrelated to the social reality of the person whose data is at issue.
V. ONLINE SEARCH
As with data, online searches are part of our social identity. And, as with data,
searches are fundamentally virtual, linking searchers anywhere in the world with
websites located anywhere in the world. But what if a territorially-based
sovereign wants to block certain search results because the sovereign objects in
some way to the underlying website that would otherwise be retrieved in the
search? In such circumstances, as in the Yahoo! case, regulators may focus on
the intermediary—here the search company—rather than the offending website,
because it is far easier to find the search company and deputize it to leverage the
regulation.
In 2014, the European Court of Justice took this approach in a case involving
Google.65 A 1995 European Council data privacy directive had recognized that
individuals possess privacy rights in data.66 As interpreted by the ECJ, such a
right allows individuals to object to old reputation-damaging online information
about them that is no longer relevant and not of sufficient public concern to
continue to be searchable.67
Significantly, rather than apply the directive against the website operator, the
Court ruled that it was Google, as the search operator, who bore responsibility
for ensuring that websites containing this sort of obsolete private information be
blocked from search results.68 Moreover, again as with the Yahoo! case, the
European Commission deemed it insufficient only to apply its ruling to
google.es, the Spanish subsidiary, instead determining that google.com must
also block offending websites from its search results.69
64 CLOUD Act, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong., § 103(b) (2018), codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2703(h)(2) (2018).
65 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12 (May
13, 2014), http://perma.cc/ED5L-DZRK.
66 Council Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
67 Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶¶ 94.
68 Id. at ¶¶ 80-83.
69 See EC Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on Google Spain v. AEPD, Nov. 26,
2014, https://perma.cc/AR4M-KS5L, at 3.
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By making Google responsible for enforcing this so-called “right to be
forgotten,” the ECJ effectively deputized Google as a sort of administrative
agency. Henceforth, any individual seeking to have a website blocked from
Google search must first file a notice with Google.70 Then, it will be Google’s
legal team that will apply the ECJ’s balancing test to see if the elements of the
right to be forgotten are satisfied and there is insufficient countervailing public
interest in the information remaining accessible.71 If the individual disagrees
with Google’s decision, then that decision can be challenged through local Data
Protection Authorities and, presumably, in court.72 Given that Google is
constantly altering its search algorithms anyway, one can understand why the
court would view this as an effective division of labor. Moreover, Google is not
jurisdictionally constrained regarding the websites it blocks from its search
algorithms, as a government regulator would be if it sought to have a website
taken down. Nevertheless, the fact is that a European court has required Google,
a US corporation, to perform a quasi-governmental adjudicatory function on a
worldwide basis (albeit only at the request of EU citizens).
More recently, a 2017 Canadian Supreme Court decision73 reprises many of
the elements we saw in the Google Spain case. In this case, Equustek, a small
Canadian technology company, brought a trademark suit in Canada against
another company, Datalink, which had been distributing its products.74 Equustek
claimed that Datalink had begun to re-label one of Equustek’s products in order
to sell the product as its own.75 Ultimately, Datalink left Canada, and although
Equustek was able to secure Canadian court orders enjoining Datalink from
continuing to sell Equustek’s products on its websites, those orders were
ineffectual because Datalink no longer had any presence or assets in Canada and
simply ignored the orders.76
Thus, we see an inherent difficulty a territorially-based sovereign may face in
enforcing its judgment. If the relevant party has insufficient presence in the
jurisdiction, there will be limited means of enforcing any order. In such a
circumstance, as we have seen already, a global data intermediary becomes a
useful way to leverage power. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Canadian
Id. at 6-7 (laying out process under which individuals may request de-listing).
Id. at 7 (discussing the assessment process of search engines in response to a delisting request); Id. at 10 (“[T]he Working Party strongly encourages the search engines to
publish their own de-listing criteria….”).
72 Id. at 11 (discussing claims brought by data subjects to Data Protection Authorities).
73 Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 34 at 34 (Can.).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See id. (“Despite court orders prohibiting the sale of inventory and the use of
[Equustek’s] intellectual property, [Datalink] continues to carry on its business from an
unknown location, selling its impugned product on its websites to customers all over the
world.”).
70
71
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courts would turn to Google, just as the European Court of Justice did in the
“right to be forgotten” context.77 As in that case, the court recognized that if a
website exists but can’t be found in a Google search the utility of that website
will be reduced to almost zero. Following the court order against Datalink and a
request from Equustek, Google agreed to de-index some but not all of Datalink’s
webpages so that they would not be found if they were being searched for on
Google’s Canadian site, google.ca.78 However, those same pages could still be
found by searching on google.com or other countries’ Google search sites.79
Thus, as with the blocking of Nazi memorabilia only on yahoo.fr, the Canadaspecific remedy was insufficient.
Equustek therefore sought a preliminary injunction against Google requiring
the company to de-index Datalink’s websites through any of its search portals
worldwide.80 Google argued in response that such an injunction would be
improperly extraterritorial as it would mean that Canada’s judgment would
dictate search results around the world.81
The Canadian Supreme Court rejected Google’s argument. According to the
Court,
[w]here it is necessary to ensure the injunction’s effectiveness, a
court can grant an injunction enjoining conduct anywhere in the
world. The problem in this case is occurring online and globally. The
Internet has no borders—its natural habitat is global. The only way
to ensure that the interlocutory injunction attained its objective was
to have it apply where Google operates—globally.82
Accordingly, the Court took a purely functionalist approach. Because there was
no other way to make its injunction against Datalink effective, it must require
Google, a non-party to the suit, to act as its global enforcement mechanism, just
as the ECJ had in the Google Spain case.
Significantly, unlike the French Yahoo! case, the concerns about chilling free
speech in this case were far less strong because the websites in question were
sales sites, and though commercial speech receives First Amendment protection
under US Constitutional law, that protection is arguably less stringent.83
Moreover, if the websites to be de-indexed were in fact infringing trademark,
de-indexing them would be unlikely to be the basis for a successful First
See supra, text accompanying notes 65-72.
Equustek Solutions, Inc., 1 S.C.R. at 34.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 557 (1980).
77
78
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Amendment claim. And of course, because Datalink is not a U.S. corporation, it
is not clear the company would have valid First Amendment rights to assert in
any event. And as to Google, it is an open question whether search results count
as speech for First Amendment purposes.84 Nevertheless, despite the lessened
First Amendment concerns at stake, Google took the same path that Yahoo! had
16 years earlier, filing for a declaratory judgment in a US court that would
declare the Canadian judgment unenforceable under US law.85 This time,
however, the law in question was section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act, which generally immunizes internet service providers against liability
arising from content created by third parties.86 And, as in the Yahoo! case, the
District Court granted the Declaratory Judgment.87
The U.S. District Court’s declaratory judgment decision is questionable on a
number of grounds. First, because no real liability was being imposed on
Google, it is possible section 230 would not apply. Moreover, no party was yet
seeking to enforce the Canadian court judgment in the United States, arguably
rendering Google’s suit unripe or requiring dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant Equustek. It was on those grounds, after all, that
the Ninth Circuit had ultimately overruled the district court order in the Yahoo!
case.88 Finally, as noted previously, even if the Canadian Supreme Court order
would violate US federal law if the order had been issued by a US court, that
does not answer the question of whether it would likewise violate federal law to
enforce another court’s judgment to the same effect. After all, the judgment
recognition decision is based on different considerations from those that are
involved in issuing an order in the first instance.89 This is particularly so given
84 Compare, e.g., Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013)
(“Too much protection would threaten to constitutionalize many areas of commerce and
private concern without promoting the values of the First Amendment.”), with Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (2013) (“[I]f we accept
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the First Amendment encompasses a great swath of
algorithm-based decisions—specifically, algorithm-based outputs that entail a substantive
communication.”). At least two district courts have ruled that search results qualify as
speech for First Amendment purposes. See Jian Zhang v. Baidu, 10 F.Supp.3d 433, 439-40
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Search King v. Google, No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003), while one district court has ruled that Google’s decision to delist a website based on the site’s failure to comply with Google policies was, unlike an
algorithm that ranks results, capable of being proven true or false and thus was not protected
by the First Amendment. See eVentures Worldwide v. Google, 188 F.Supp.3d 1265, 1274
(M.D. Fla. 2016). To date, there has been no federal appellate or Supreme Court decision
addressing the extent of First Amendment protection afforded to search results.
85 See Google v. Equustek Solutions, No. 5:17-cv-04207, 2017 WL 5000834, *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 2017).
86 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
87 Equustek Solutions, 2017 WL 5000834, *1.
88 See supra, text accompanying notes 31-33.
89 See supra, text accompanying notes 25-30.
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that most of the First Amendment concerns in the Yahoo! case were not present
here.
In the end, although the district court’s declaratory judgment order (assuming
it stands) seems to create a jurisdictional stalemate, the reality is that Equustek
need not ever seek enforcement of the Canadian Supreme Court judgment in the
United States anyway because Google presumably wants to continue to do
business in Canada as an ongoing commercial enterprise there, and so it is highly
likely that Google will ultimately comply with the order, just as Yahoo! did in
France. Thus, the declaratory judgment action may be more a public relations
ploy than a serious effort to thwart extraterritorial enforcement.
Ultimately, these cases not only illustrate issues of jurisdiction, but also the
increased importance of intermediaries such as virtual world operators, online
service providers, social media companies and search engines. Given that our
social lives are conducted through, or stored with, these intermediary companies,
those companies are likely to become the brokers that territorially-based
governments use to pursue regulation. And of course, the increasing power those
companies have over data means that they will often be the target of complaints
by individuals.
VI. VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION
Intermediaries also enable our virtual communication over media such as
Skype, Google Hangouts, Zoom, and so on. This too raises questions about how
much information those intermediaries collect and are required to disclose.
For example, Belgian authorities in 2009, seeking to require Yahoo! to
disclose subscriber information about Yahoo! users as part of a fraud
investigation, reprised certain arguments made during the French efforts against
Yahoo! a decade earlier.90 And Yahoo! once again argued that the application of
the Belgium statute to a company without a physical presence in Belgium was
impermissibly extraterritorial.91 Moreover, Yahoo!’s argument was perhaps
even more compelling than in the earlier French case because, although there
was a country-specific yahoo.be website, unlike in the French case it does not
appear that Yahoo! even had a Belgium subsidiary operating locally.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Belgium rejected Yahoo!’s argument.92
90 Public Prosecutor v. Yahoo!, Inc., Cours d’Appel [CA] Hoven van Beroep [HvB]
[Court of Appeal], Nov. 20, 2013, 2012/CO/1054 Yahoo! Inc. (Belg.), translated
in 11 DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 137, 137 (2014).
91 Id. at 141.
92 Public Prosecutor v. Yahoo!, Inc., Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation]
[Supreme Court of Belgium], Dec. 1, 2015, No. P.13.2082.N (Belg.), translated
in 13 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 156, 158 (2016).
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Significantly, the court took an extremely broad view both regarding the scope
of the statute and Belgian law enforcement authority more generally. First,
according to the court, the Belgian law at issue covered “any operator or service
provider that actively directs [its] economic activity to consumers in Belgium,”
regardless of whether or not the operator or provider has a physical presence in
Belgium.93 In addition, the court reasoned that enforcing the law would not
require Belgian authorities to act extraterritorially because the statute at issue
did not “require Belgian police officers or magistrates, nor [any] persons acting
on their behalf to be physically outside the jurisdiction.”94 From this perspective,
the authorities were simply staying in Belgium asking for data to be provided by
Yahoo!. Interestingly, whereas the Second Circuit had ruled that US law
enforcement authorities could not collect information held abroad because it was
akin to traveling beyond their territorial boundaries, the Belgian court
emphasized that the Belgian authorities were simply remaining in the
jurisdiction receiving data from elsewhere.95
Subsequently, a lower court in Belgium has applied the logic of the Yahoo!
case to assert jurisdiction over Skype in a case where Belgian authorities sought
not only subscriber information but the content of communications as well. 96
Skype complied with regard to registration information, but argued that because
Skype is a Luxembourg company there was no jurisdiction in Belgium.97
Instead, according to Skype, any request for communications content must
proceed via a mutual legal assistance request of the Luxembourg government.98
The Belgian court rejected this argument. The court ruled that, even though
Skype was based in Luxembourg, it was “target[ing] Belgian consumers on the
Belgian economic market” by offering services there and was therefore subject
to Belgian jurisdiction.99 Echoing the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in
Yahoo!, the court characterized the enforcement action as occurring within
Belgium because presumably the requested data would be handed over there,
regardless of where that data might have been collected or stored and regardless
of whether or not the underlying target of the investigation was a Belgian
citizen.100
Id. at 157.
Id.
95 Id.
96 Public Prosecutor v. Skype, Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First
Instance], Mechelen, Oct. 27, 2016, No. ME 20.4.1 105151-12, ¶¶ 1.2-1.5 (Belg.),
https://perma.cc/C5Z7-EZ9Y.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Carly Page, Microsoft Forced to Pay eur30k Fine for Refusing to Hand Over Skype
Data, THE INQUIRER (Nov. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/7GDS-M9BA.
100 Public Prosecutor v. Yahoo!, Inc., Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation]
[Supreme Court of Belgium], Dec. 1, 2015, No. P.13.2082.N (Belg.), translated
93
94
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Thus, the two Belgian cases go far beyond what even the US Government
argued in the Microsoft case because at least with Microsoft the Government
clearly had jurisdiction over the intermediary, which was indisputably based in
Washington state. In contrast, neither Yahoo! nor Skype had either a physical
presence in Belgium or even a subsidiary there. And if the test is merely whether
a company “actively directs economic activity to consumers in Belgium” by
offering services to Belgian customers, then jurisdiction may potentially extend
to any web page viewed in Belgium regardless of where the content originated.
Such a position recalls early internet jurisdiction cases in the United States that
asserted jurisdiction over websites wherever they were viewed or viewable,
conceptualizing a website as a 24-hour-a-day advertisement “entering” every
jurisdiction where the website was accessible.101
VII. GLOBAL ELECTRONIC CURRENCIES AND TRANSACTIONS
Although the global alternative currency Bitcoin has generated the most
attention, it is only one instantiation of a more general ledger technology known
as blockchain.102 Blockchains store data in distributed computers and chain them
together to form an unbroken record of that information.103 The information
stored could be currency transactions, but it could also be any automated
executable set of instructions, such as an insurance contract that pays out
automatically if a given event occurs. Two features make blockchain technology
valuable. First, identical copies of the particular blockchain (or ledger) are stored
on, and accessed from, potentially thousands of computers around the world.104
Any change to information on one is immediately and automatically
authenticated by the others, and any authenticated change immediately updates
on all computers in the chain.105 Second, the information is encrypted so that, in
combination with its decentralization, it is difficult to hack.106
in 13 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 156, 157 (2016).
101 See, e.g., Inset Systems. Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996).
102 See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca, The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and Blockchain
Transactions, 47 No. 2 UCC. L. J. Art 4, 1 (2017) (“A blockchain is a distributed database,
with entries verified by parties on the blockchain, using public encryption. Bitcoin and other
public blockchains permit reliable identification of every transaction that has occurred on
the blockchain.”).
103 See id.
104 See id. at 4-5. (“A blockchain . . . allows anyone interested to see what valid
transactions have occurred, allows free access without permission of a bank or government,
and could be more efficient than having all the parties keep separate ledgers or sets of
books.”).
105 See id. (describing how Bitcoin, and blockchains more generally, work).
106 See id. at 12.
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On the other hand, those same features make blockchains potentially difficult
to regulate. Not only do blockchain transactions cross borders, but it will often
be difficult to identify a particular computer or entity that is responsible if there
is a dispute or problem. As one commenter has described it, “the infrastructure
does not fall under any traditional jurisdiction, but the users of the infrastructure
also naturally evade any sense of traditional jurisdiction. All parties may transact
entirely anonymously on a public blockchain.”107
So far, blockchain technology has not been deployed sufficiently for us to
know precisely how legal challenges are likely to be resolved. And the
assumption that blockchain transactions completely lack connection to a
territorially-based entity may be over-stated. That is because the parties to a
blockchain transaction are still physically located somewhere on Earth, just as
the participants in a virtual world are physically somewhere sitting in front of a
screen. And, to the extent that money changes hands, that money is in some form
sent from one physical place to another, creating a territorial nexus.
For example, in Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., the plaintiff wired money from
a Wells Fargo branch account in California to a bank in Japan, which then held
the funds in an account used by a Bitcoin exchange.108 So, although the Bitcoin
transactions themselves might not have a location, the exchange interacted with
a bank chartered in Japan, and that bank in turn interacted with a bank in
California, making all of the defendants potentially subject to jurisdiction in
California.109
Of course, when we say that money was “sent from California to Japan,” we
are really talking about metaphysical electronic signals crossing borders, and so
we are in a sense using what is already a fictional connection to the physical
world to territorially ground a Bitcoin transaction, which is an even more
fictional connection to the physical world. It remains to be seen at what point all
that is solid will melt into air and legal jurisdiction based on territory will cease
to be meaningful as a way to describe and regulate electronic transactions at all.

107 Wulf A. Kaal & Craig Calcaterra, Blockchain Technology’s Distributed Jurisdiction,
MEDIUM (June 20, 2017), https://medium.com/semadaresearch/blockchain-technologysdistributed-jurisdiction-a2177c244538.
108 Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 169 F.Supp.3d 855, 859 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
109 See id. at 862-63. (“[T]he conduct here alleged is sufficient to establish that Mizuho
purposefully directed its conduct to California, given that the torts were completed only
when Mizuho knowingly accepted a deposit from a California branch from somebody it
knew to be a California resident and placed that deposit into the financial equivalent of a
black hole.”).
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VIII. AUTONOMOUS AGENTS
The development of unmanned aerial vehicles and increasingly autonomous
weapons systems as well as the potential use of drones, autonomous
automobiles, and other robots using artificial intelligence radically challenge
legal conceptions of jurisdiction and accountability. In particular, autonomous,
machine-learning vehicles tend to spread responsibility for decision-making
across a larger number of actors. Thus, it becomes difficult to determine both
who is responsible for a machine-based action when it causes harm, and where
the relevant action took place in order to determine legal responsibility and
jurisdiction.
So far, this issue has been most explored in the context of automated
weaponry and warfare. For example, consider the Israeli Harpy which, once
launched by a human operator, can detect an enemy radar system and then
autonomously dive bomb and strike that target.110 As Laura Dickinson recounts:
If the Harpy killed a large number of civilians in a manner that could
be said to violate international humanitarian law, who could or
should be held responsible? The human being who has the
responsibility to override the weapons system? The commander of
the territory where the weapons system was deployed? The
individuals who set policy for using the technology? The individuals
who drafted the targeting criteria? The engineers who designed the
weapons system to apply the targeting criteria? Anyone who supplied
intelligence that fed into the weapons system and that formed the
basis for target selection? In the case of even partially autonomous
systems, it is difficult to locate a responsible human agent.111
Similar questions can, and almost certainly will, be raised by automation in
vehicles and by machine-learning based robotics and drones for commercial and
consumer use. These new deployments will likely reshape legal rules regarding
product liability, insurance, contract, jurisdiction, criminal law, and other areas.

110 Laura A. Dickinson, Drones, Automated Weapons, and Private Military Contractors:
Challenges to Domestic and International Legal Regimes Governing Armed Conflict, in
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 93, 122 (Molly K. Land & Jay
D. Aronson eds., 2018); see also Marcus Wagner, The Dehumanization of International
Humanitarian Law: Legal, Political, and Ethical Implications of Autonomous Weapons
Systems 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1371, 1381 (2014); H. Roff, Killing in War:
Responsibility, Liability and Lethal Autonomous Robots, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (A. Henschke et al. eds., 2013).
111 Dickinson, supra note 110, at 122.
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IX. CONCLUSION
As difficult as the cases discussed above may be to resolve, if anything the
future holds issues that may be tougher still. New deployments expanding the
“virtual” in social life will likely reshape legal rules regarding product liability,
insurance, contract, jurisdiction, criminal law, and other areas.
Or possibly not. Ever since the rise of the commercial internet in 1995, legal
scholarship regarding online innovation has often divided into two broad camps.
On one side were the cyberspace “unexceptionalists,” who argued in various
contexts that the online medium did not significantly alter the legal framework
and that well-settled principles of law can simply be applied to online
interaction.112 On the other, cyberspace “exceptionalists” argued that the
medium itself created radically new problems that required new analytical work
to be done.113
One core problem with the unexceptionalist position is that it assumes that
there actually are well-settled principles of law that can simply be applied to
new legal settings without alteration. And yet it is the nature of law that it
changes over time. Thus, what is well-settled for one generation (or in one
century) is apt to be very different from what is well-settled for the next. Even
more importantly, new technologies that alter the culture are precisely the sorts
of changes that tend to result in shifts to well-settled legal principles.
For example, in the nineteenth century “well-settled” US principles of legal
jurisdiction and choice of law saw jurisdiction as rooted almost exclusively in
the territorial power of the sovereign.114 Each sovereign was deemed to have
jurisdiction, exclusive of all other sovereigns, to bind persons and things present
within its territorial boundaries. By the early twentieth century, growth of
interstate commerce, transportation, and cross-border corporate activity put
pressure on the idea that a state’s judicial power extended only to its territorial
boundary. In particular, the invention of the automobile and the development of
the modern corporation meant that far-away entities could inflict harm within a

112 E.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 475, 475 (1998); Allan R. Stein, The
Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 1167,
1167-68 (1998). Many of these arguments are reprised in Andrew K. Woods, Against Data
Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 729 (2016).
113 E.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN L. REV. 1367 (1996); David G. Post, Against Cyberanarchy, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1371-73 (2002). Many of these arguments are echoed in
Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179, 179 (2018); see also Paul Schiff
Berman, Legal Jurisdiction and the Deterritorialization of Data, supra note 9, at 12 (2018)
(responding to Daskal’s article and pointing to continuities with earlier legal scholarship
concerning online interaction).
114 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
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state without actually being present there at the time of a lawsuit.115 Not
surprisingly, by the end of the twentieth century it had become “well-settled” in
US jurisdiction jurisprudence that a state may at least sometimes assert
jurisdiction over a defendant if the effects of the defendant’s activities are felt
within the state’s borders, even if the defendant has not literally set foot there.116
Likewise, it had become “well-settled” that choice-of-law rules could be based
on governmental interests or relationships as well as territorial connections.117
And, of course, these new “well-settled” rules felt as commonsensical and
obvious to most judges, lawyers, and observers as the sovereigntist view felt in
the nineteenth century.
Now, it seems safe to say that jurisdictional, choice-of-law, and judgment
recognition rules are in flux again, at least in part because of the virtualization
of social life. Indeed, as the cases described in this Essay suggest, the idea of
basing jurisdiction on where effects are felt is difficult to apply to online
interaction because activity may cause harms in many different locations,
anywhere data is stored, used, or viewed.
The answers that law will ultimately evolve to address the sorts of problems
raised in this Essay are difficult to predict, and scholars and judges will no doubt
have differing approaches to specific questions of jurisdiction, choice of law,
and judgment recognition regarding online interaction, virtual worlds, data
storage, digital currencies, autonomous entities, and the like. Suffice to say that
however one resolves the issues, “well-settled” principles of law are unlikely to
be very helpful because such principles are themselves always in flux, often
precisely because of the pressures placed on such principles by new
communications technologies such as the internet and new ways in which social
lives become deterritorialized. Thus, in some sense a pure unexceptionalist
position is difficult to maintain. But if unexceptionalists have relied too much
on the application of mythical well-settled principles, the exceptionalists have,
at times, tended to the opposite extreme, assuming that the rise of online
interaction, data storage and the like upend nearly all extant ideas about law and
the role of the state.
Moreover, as the discussion of digital data makes clear, governments need not
only act through the traditional apparatus of lumbering, territorially-limited law
enforcers or regulators. Instead, they can commandeer entities such as search
engines or online service providers to regulate on the government’s behalf, either
by turning over data, adjudicating claims, or building certain regulations into the
computer code that dictates online activity itself.
115
116
117

See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
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Perhaps then we need to evolve a more cosmopolitan and pluralist vision of
conflict of laws. Just as a rigidly territorial conception of jurisdiction eventually
gave way in the first part of the twentieth century to the idea of jurisdiction based
on contacts with a sovereign entity, so too a contacts-based approach may now
be yielding to a conception of jurisdiction based on multiple community
affiliations. A cosmopolitan118 approach allows us to think of community not as
a geographically determined territory circumscribed by fixed boundaries, but as
a set of multiple affiliations held simultaneously. In addition, if nation-states are
imagined, historically contingent communities defined by admittedly arbitrary
geographical boundaries, and if those nation-states—because of transnational
flows of information, capital, and people—no longer define unified communities
(if they ever did), then there is no conceptual justification for conceiving of
nation-states as possessing a monopoly on the assertion of jurisdiction. Instead,
any comprehensive theory of jurisdiction must acknowledge that non-state
communities also assert various claims to jurisdictional authority and articulate
alternative norms that are often incorporated into more “official” legal regimes.
This pluralist119 understanding of jurisdiction helps us to see that law is not
merely the coercive command of a sovereign power, but a language for
imagining alternative future worlds. Moreover, various norm-generating
communities (not just the sovereign) are always contesting the shape of such
worlds.120
Finally, as this survey of cases makes clear, in a world of virtual social life
and deterritorialized data, the role of intermediaries as law-makers and lawenforcers has radically increased. When Facebook enforces a Terms of Service
agreement, or Twitter is asked (or required) to police hate speech, or Google
implements a European Court of Justice ruling, we can call these acts of
intermediaries law or not, but a pluralist would argue that it doesn’t matter how
you define it; the fact is that these actions affect the behavior of real people in

118
By “cosmopolitan,” I refer to a multivalent perspective that recognizes the wide
variety of affiliations people feel toward a range of communities, from the most local to the
most global. I therefore distinguish cosmopolitanism from a universalist vision (often
associated with cosmopolitanism), which sees people solely, or primarily, as members of
one world community. Cosmopolitanism, as I use the term, involves an ideal of multiple
attachments; it does not necessarily entail the erasure of nonglobal community affiliations.
See, e.g., Bruce Robbins, Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in
COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 1, 3 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce
Robbins eds., 1998) (“[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing
cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a
distance.”).
119 For a more detailed application of the insights of legal pluralism to private
international law, see Berman, GLOBAL LEGAL P LURALISM, supra note 8.
120 See generally, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term–Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1983).
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the real world. Indeed, the actions of intermediaries can have more impact than
the sometimes empty commands of a sovereign. A pluralist perspective has the
advantage of not getting caught up in definitions of law but instead recognizing
that the quasi-law created, imposed, and/or applied by non-governmental entities
should remain within our legal analytical purview whether we call them law or
not.121
In any event, it is incumbent on legal scholars today to recognize the new
challenges arising in this increasingly virtual, data-driven world and to build new
cosmopolitan pluralist legal models that may, over time, become simply the way
we conceptualize law in the 21st century. After all, law and society are forever
like a Mobius strip, each turning into the other, and what seems unsettled and
new to us now may become the commonplace assumptions of future generations.
Neither law nor society ever stop moving, and so we must push forward to
develop new models to respond to new practices in new contexts.

As I have argued elsewhere,
[P]luralism frees scholars from needing an essentialist definition of “law.” For
example, with legal pluralism as our analytical frame, we can get beyond the
endless debates both about whether international law is law at all and whether
it has any real effect. Indeed, the whole debate about law v. non-law is largely
irrelevant in a pluralism context because the key questions involve the
normative commitments of a community and the interactions among normative
orders that give rise to such commitments, not their formal status. Thus, we can
resist positivist reductionism and set nation-state law within a broader context.
Moreover, an emphasis on social norms allows us to more readily see how it is
that nonstate legal norms can have significant impact on the world. After all, if
a statement of norms is ultimately internalized by a population, that statement
will have important binding force, often even more so than a formal law
backed by state sanction. Accordingly, by taking pluralism seriously we will
more easily see the way in which the contest over norms creates legitimacy
over time, and we can put to rest the idea that norms not associated with
nation-states necessarily lack significance. Indeed, legal pluralists refuse to
focus solely on who has the formal authority to articulate norms or the coercive
power to enforce them. Instead, they aim to study empirically which statements
of authority tend to be treated as binding in actual practice and by whom.
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1177-78 (2007)
(footnotes omitted).
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